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“We may take an analogy from war. The actual immediate benefits of war are rarely significant,
either to victor or defeated. But the benefits which may be gained by the threat of war may be
considerable: and yet the threat carries no terrors if the sanction of war is never used.”
—historian EP Thompson (1971)

In 2016 26,000 tenured and non-tenured faculty of the California State University (CSU) system
threatened to go on strike. Only days before it was to begin the strike was called off. The CSU
system moved towards meeting some of the demands of the faculty and a new contract was settled and soon ratified by the membership. Did the faculty make a credible strike threat that ultimately served to avoid the disruption of a strike? As a member of the CSU faculty who participated in making the strike threat the question of what makes a strike threat credible has never
been investigated. That is the object of this study. In our study of strike threats using an on-line
survey and in depth phone interviews, we have found that if strike threats are included in the
count it would nearly double the prevalence of strike activity in the US between 2012 and 2016.
This estimate of strike activity is not only significantly higher than the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimate. Identifying what makes a strike threat credible is certain to have significant lessons for the resurgence of the labor movement. The higher than reported strike activity is
bound to raise questions about the impact on economic and political conditions in the US.
Counting Strike Threats
Contrary to popular belief and BLS reports tracking strike activity, more workers than ever are
involved in strike activity in the United States. According to our on-line survey conducted during
the Winter and Spring of 2017, between 2012-2016 the number of workers threatening to strike
was 199 percent higher than the number who actually did strike according to the BLS. While the
number of strikes has continued on a steady decline over the past few decades, the evidence
points to more workers ready and willing to strike. We call the willingness to strike, and the capacity to do so, a credible strike threat, and argue that it should be counted as strike activity.
But credible strike threats should be more than counted. They should also be assessed for
whether they accomplish the goal of workers who make them, whether it be demands for wages
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and benefits, working conditions, or control, without actually striking. If they do achieve their
goals it must be asked what made them credible. Inversely, if they failed what necessary characteristics did they lack that would have made the threat credible.
Credible Strike Threats in the Literature
Credible strike threats have remained marginal to research into unions and strikes. Our review
found only a single article published since 1987 focused on strike threats and no book or report.
While credible strike threats receive periodic mention in the popular and academic press they
tend to be associated with specific labor conflicts.2 Nevertheless, credible strike threats have received passing mention in assessments of collective bargaining and the declining number of
strikes.
Becker has observed that the National Labor Relations Board and court rulings have impeded the
use of tactics such as restrictions on secondary activities essential for making a credible strike
threat.3 Without credible strike threats workers and unions lack effective pressure to compel employers to negotiate.4
Credible strike threats have also been raised in legal cases testing the legality of public workers’
right to strike. In a 1985 case, the California Supreme Court found that a credible strike threat
can alter the balance of power in such a way as to prevent an illegal strike from taking place.
“Without the right to strike, or at least a credible strike threat, public employees have little negotiating strength. This, in turn, produces frustrations which exacerbate labor-management conflicts and often provoke ‘illegal’ strikes.”5 The court observed that a credible strike threat can reduce the incidences of strikes by raising their potential costs.
In the absence of some means of equalizing the parties' respective bargaining positions, such
as a credible strike threat, both sides are less likely to bargain in good faith; … this in turn
leads to unsatisfactory and acrimonious labor relations and ironically to more and longer
strikes. Equally as important, the possibility of a strike often provides the best impetus for
parties to reach an agreement at the bargaining table, because both parties lose if a strike actually comes to pass. Thus by providing a clear incentive for resolving disputes, a credible
strike threat may serve to avert, rather than to encourage, work stoppages.6
There is disagreement about the perception of potential costs to workers from making credible
strike threats. Maranto and Fiorito suggest that a union’s record of striking and making credible
strike threats may produce bad publicity and negative public opinion thereby increasing the cost
to the union during a representation election if workers perceive possible income loss from potential strikes.7
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Lindbeck and Snower’s study of credible strike threats and lock outs is the only article focused
on credible strike threats published in hte past 30 years. They provide a quantitative expression
of “the union's formulation of wage proposals so as to preserve strike threat credibility.”8 Such
wage proposals are calculated based on the interaction between wages, profits, costs of hiring
and firing, fiscal policy such as unemployment benefits and income taxes. They argue that the
probability of a strike is not due to merely to labor market demand but what they call “union
punch”—that is the expected cost to the employer from a credible strike threat. In contrast to
Maranto and Fiorito, Lindbeck and Snower find that even if workers lose the strike and return to
work the cost of making a strike threat is lower than losing their income due to replacement.9
While Lindbeck and Snower's conclusion provides a useful tool to assess the role of a wage demand in the credibility of a strike threat, the overlooks the tactical and strategic factors that make
a strike threat credible. The workers themselves play no role in the analysis.
Findings
We found 134 strike threats between 2012 and 2016 in our survey of published news reports on
strike related activity. Of these, 97 strike threats were settled without a strike in firms of any size
workforce involving 701,700 workers. 73 of the 134 strike threats occurred in workplaces with
fewer than 1,000 workers, strikes not counted by the BLS. Of these 73 strike threats, 20 resulted
in strikes involving 8,573 workers, 6 strike threats had an unknown outcome at the time of the
study, and the remainder resulted in no strike.
In contrast, the BLS reported 72 strikes in firms with 1,000 or more employees involving
352,000 workers. The number of threats was 134.7 percent higher than the number of strikes during this time and involved was 199 percent—nearly double the number of workers than went on
strike.
Our findings do not tell us whether the strike threats were credible. While it is difficult to thoroughly examine the outcome of each strike threat we will explore several characteristic examples
of strike threats were were not credible, failed to result in the employer making acceptable concessions, and thus resulted in strikes. We will also examine strike threats that could be deemed
credible and were settled without a strike.
However it is possible to conclude from our findings that the BLS is under-reporting strike activity in the US because it fails to count workers who are actually organizing and threatening to
strike. The underreporting of strike activity may be motivated by and have certain consequences.
Because strike activity corresponds to higher labor and political costs it is in the interests of the
federal government to underreport strike activity for several reasons. Reporting lower than actual
strikes can keep wages down by discouraging workers from joining unions and engaging in
strike activity. Why join a union or go on strike if few others are willing to take the risk of also
doing so? It can also serve to keep wages down for employers who can demand wage, benefit
and other concessions without fear of strike related disruption. Lower strike numbers also impacts interest rates, job growth, investment, profits, wages, and most importantly the strategy of
8
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much of the labor movement which has increasingly avoided the perception or reality of engaging in strike related activities. Lower strike related numbers are also associated with lower political costs. Whichever political party controls the presidency, Congress, and particular state governments is less likely to suffer at the ballot box for higher inflation, job loss, and the other effects.
Methods
Our methods for collecting strikes threats is similar to the way the BLS gathers its information
about strikes. Surprisingly, for a federal government agency the BLS count is not very systematic. There is no requirement that a strike be reported so the BLS relies on interviews, voluntary
reporting, and media coverage. The BLS reports that

of

Information on work stoppages is obtained from reports from the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, state labor market information offices, BLS Strike Report from the Office
Employment and Unemployment Statistics, and from media sources. Parties involved in the work
stoppage (employer, association, union) are contacted to verify the duration and number of
workers idled by the stoppage.10

In addition, the BLS estimates the number of strikes through its Current Employment Statistics
(CES) survey. Like the BLS Strike Report the CES obtains its information about strikes involving 1,000 or more workers from public sources including the media and company or union information that is available publically. The survey is intended to estimate the impact of strikes on
monthly employment estimates. The CES differs from the BLS Strike Report because the later
defines “work stoppages” to “include all stoppages lasting a full shift or longer, while the CES
Strike Report only includes strikes lasting the entirety of the survey reference pay period.”11
There are several problems with relying on media coverage to measure the number of strike
threats. First, there are virtually no full-time professional journalists covering labor issues. Second, labor conflicts are often ignored by the media until they actually result in a strike. As a result, relying only on the media to estimate the number of strike threats relative to strikes is likely
to result in an undercount and is also much harder to estimate. Lastly, despite the media coverage
of strikes in workplaces with fewer than 1,000 employees the BLS does not record the information. By rounding to the nearest hundred, and reporting company and union data that is possibly rounded, the BLS may be undercounting the number of striking workers.12
While we also used a review of the news coverage we supplemented it by also proactively contacting union officers and rank and file members directly by email and phone and by posting announcements in a labor magazine email newsletter, and on discussion lists and Facebook walls
that we sought union staff, officers, and active members involved in strike threats to answer our
on-line survey and volunteer to be interviewed. A combination of an on-line survey and structured phone interviews were conducted over a period of four months from February to May
2017. The questions were drafted by Dr. Ovetz with input from Dr. Helena Worthen.

10

See https://www.bls.gov/wsp/wspfaq.htm#Question_9, Accessed June 27, 2017.
Mullins, 2015.
12
https://www.bls.gov/wsp/monthly_listing.htm
11

4

In total, 48 answered the survey and 10 were interviewed on the phone for about 20-30 minutes.
Of the 48 respondents to our on-line survey, nearly half reported that they belonged to or worked
for a union that had made a strike threat that resulted in a positive outcome thereby avoiding the
strike (25), a little less than one third did not answer (14), and about one fifth answered no (9).
The respondents self-identified as elected union leader (13), union staff (10), rank and file member (9), supporters of union activism (2), and no identified role (14). Although 19 of the 48 did
not finish answering the survey or skipped questions we used all of the answers provided.
We also conducted 10 structured phone interviews with 11 union officer and staff (one interview
included two respondents) lasting between 25-40 minutes each. One of the interview respondents
is an elected officer, one is a retired staff member, and the remaining respondents are current
staff members. As much as possible we qualify whether our data originates from the “survey” or
“interviews.” Interview subjects have been each assigned a name to anonymize them.
The over-representation of leadership and staff among those we interviewed and surveyed illustrates the self-selection bias in our data set. Leadership and staff are more likely to be reading
postings and articles in the publications and on the website and social media where we did outreach. They also have more time to answer our questions since they can do it during work hours
since it could be considered part of their work duties.
Many survey respondents answered anonymously, requested anonymity, did not disclose their
affiliation, or requested prior review of our written reports before they would grant approval to
be identified. For this reason we have chosen to not mention any survey or interview respondents
by name or their specific union instead calling them a “respondent”. To shield their identity, we
refer generally to their sector of work and avoid indicating any other specific details that might
identify them. We have not given our results to any of the respondents for their prior review before publication.
The question of anonymity is a crucial issue for the focus of our investigation. We are asking
about extremely sensitive issues of tactics, strategies, and objectives that are widely discussed
internally in union executive council, staff, and membership meetings that are closed to the public and even many union members. Being a union activist or an advocate for striking today is
high risk. Identifying a respondent in this report is certain to be read by management and industry officials. You can be targeted in your employment, find it difficult to obtain work, and risk
physical threats.
The questions require confidentiality because they get to heart of the class conflict: the balance
of power between workers and employers. We are not aware of anyone researching these questions. There is no historical literature detailing prior disclosures of this information. Even few
rank and file members are privy to discussions of tactics, strategies, and objectives in most unions due to differing levels of internal democracy. Due to the lack of internal sources of our respondents’s answers we cannot confidently verify the reliability and credibility of what they reported in their survey and interview responses. For this reason we have attempted confirm relevant details through the literature review.
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The act of just investigating the question of credible strike threats by asking these questions
places us in a precarious position. We expected the sensitivity of the questions we asked to raise
concern, alarm, and suspicion and they did. Despite the investigator and advisor having well established credentials writing about labor issues and having been paid and unpaid labor organizers
did not fully satisfy all of the potential respondents approached to complete the survey or interview. It was difficult to even interview a staff member with one of the investigator’s own unions
which issued one of the largest strike threats in our study. Several staff and elected officers of
this union, with which he has been a member for five years and participated in the strike threat
either did not respond to emails or phone calls or asked for a detailed explanation of why the research was being done and a biographical background. Eventually we were granted an interview
and the survey was answered.
In some ways, this suspicion and difficulty at identifying a willing respondent and respondents
willing to go on the record to complete the interviews or survey demonstrates one of the most
critical questions facing a union issuing a strike threat: openly communicating with its’ membership so as to encourage them self-organize their threatened strike or telling them what to do to
prepare. How a union answers this question is one of the key criteria for making a credible strike
threat. A union that does not adequately communicate with and among the membership about the
threatened strike will not be capable of organizing a credible strike threat. The union and the
strike will be perceived by the employer to be staff led and not member led and that the commitment to strike will be shallow.
Data
Our literature review identified a steady number of strike threats made between 2012 and 2015
increasing substantially in 2016. (See Table 1 at the end of this manuscript). While the number of
workers involved in the threats fluctuated wildly the number in 2016 was more than three times
higher than in 2012. Although this time range is extremely short it did illustrate that while the
number of strike threats was steady between 2012 to 2016 the number of workers involved was
growing. In total, 72 percent (97 of 134) of the reported strike threats were settled without a
strike. Further study is needed to adequately assess the reason for the resulting strikes and
whether the outcomes of both the strike threats and resulting strikes were advantageous for the
workers involved.
If we compare our findings of strike threats to strikes reported by the BLS (See Table 2 at the
end of this manuscript) the annual average number of strike threats (19.4) was also about one
third higher than the annual average number of strikes measured by the BLS (14.4).
What Makes a Credible Strike Threat
There are significant differences between a strike threat and a strike which we will focus on here.
First, strike threats can take several forms. It may be made as an official declaration by workers
or their union than they intend to strike. They also be intangible as workers threaten to strike if
the employer does not recognize and negotiate with them as a self-organized body. Workers who
begin taking clearly identifiable actions in preparation for a strike such as raising dues for a
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strike fund, educating the membership about strikes, taking “sick outs”, engaging in street actions, picketing, and other actions discussed below, could all be considered making a strike
threat. Official declarations often follow intangible strike threats but need not if the employer
concedes following actions that are considered a strike threat.
Workers in a recognized union that has engaged in collective bargaining with the employer may
only threaten to strike after a long bureaucratic process governed by state or federal labor law is
exhausted. Workers in some industries, such as transport, are covered under different labor laws.
State and local public workers are covered by state laws which also impose limited or ban
strikes. Summarizing the rules that govern when a union may officially threaten to strike is outside the scope of this study. In contrast, workers who do not have a recognized union may strike
at any time. Some workers who issue a strike threat will announce the day it will begin and frequently how long it will last and when it will end. Not all threats are equal. This paper will examine why some are more credible than others.
Whatever form strike activity takes or whether it is called a sick out or walkout a credible strike
threat is one in which the preparations to strike are perceived by the employer to result in a strike
that will be more costly than conceding to the workers’ demands in order to avoid it. If an employer is sufficiently persuaded of the creidbility of strike threat they may settle to avoid the
strike. However, if they are not the strike may occur.
However, the act of striking alone is not sufficient to establish that the strike threat was credible.
If the workers strike without adequate support from the workers, allies, or a sufficient strike fund

they may lose the strike and return with little to nothing gained (See Table 3). Alternately, they
may engage in a strike of limited duration in which the workers announce the duration of the
strike in advance. This may be considered a symbolic strike. Again, they may return with little to
nothing gained. In short, the more credible the strike threat, the more likely the employer is
likely to concede to the workers demands without a strike or once the strike occurs and the employer becomes convinced. However, what is little understood is that the act of striking alone
does not demonstrate the credibility of the strike. Below, we examine the elements of what
makes a strike threat credible.
Second, what we measured is different from what the BLS measures in several important ways.
These differences may account for our substantially different outcomes. The BLS only measures
7

strikes involving 1,000 or more workers. Although only .3% of US business have 500 workers or
more13 large employers make up the vast majority of the workforce. Our study counted all threats
to strike in workplaces with any number of workers. The reason we counted any strike threat is
to capture a more accurate estimate of how many workers are participating in strike related actions throughout the economy not just in large firms. The BLS’s cut off at 1,000 or more workers
in reality only counts a tiny minority of all employers and is certain to be a significant undercount of strikes although that has yet to be verified.
Lastly, the BLS does not count any strike threats, only actual strikes and lockouts (eg, capital
strikes). We excluded any strike threats in workplaces with greater than 1,000 workers that resulted in either a lockout or strike because the BLS counts those as strikes by either employers or
workers. It should also be noted that some of the threats made in 2016 were still ongoing and had
not yet resulted in a strike or lockout during our data collection in February to May 2017.
Preparing a Credible Strike Threat
Issuing a strike threat can take different forms. A threat may be specific, indicating the time and
date it will begin, the work locations affected, and the length of time it will last. Other strike
threats may be made by the act of preparing to strike. While the survey and interview respondents reported a variety of processes to prepare for a strike or issue a strike threat there are several
common themes that emerged in the study. The most common factor is the need to communicate
with, educate, and organize the membership so as to prepare to strike. Secondarily, respondents
reflected on the need to organize allies and communicate with the public. Both of these elements
are critical to clearly communicating a credible strike threat to the employer in order to move it
to settling with the workers to avoid the strike. These factors underlie some of the critical factors
for issuing a credible a strike threat.
Communicating with and Organizing the Membership
In all of the cases we examined the workers took a strike vote. To prepare for the strike threat
vote survey respondents reported using a range of tactics to educate the membership about the
diverse issues including the bargaining process, the need to act on grievances, potential need to
strike, the process for striking, the issues they would strike over, the costs and benefits of striking, existing strike benefits, and the danger of crossing the picket line. While nearly all the respondents agreed that a strike threat must be prepared long in advance of the vote, let alone the
strike, there were a range of different approaches to both educating and organizing the membership to make the threat credible. These issues were communicated through formal and informational communications tools and techniques.
All of these means of communicating the intent and willingness of the membership to strike
could be seen as analogous to drawing on savings in a bank account. If workers make a threat,
prepare to carry it out but then do not follow through or follow through and lose the strike the
value of their deposit has been diminished. If the workers had recently issued a credible strike
threat that resulted in an advantageous outcome the value of its deposit grows. However, if they
13
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have become inactive the value is diminished. Some unions maintain the value of previous credible strike threats by continuously organizing, educating the membership, and engaging in action
on grievances for example.14
Opal summed up the role of a strike threat very succinctly by explaining that “a strike vote can’t
be just a threat or a ‘tool’ to give your team bargaining power, the threat needs to be real. Members need to be prepared—solid information, robust strike committees with rank and file members, plan visible and creative actions the employer sees and understands.” A survey respondent
emphasized that “we built for a strike. We had every intention of striking, and members prepared
themselves for that.” One of these two respondents noted how a previous strike strengthened a
later strike threat so as to avoid a strike while the other reported that a successful earlier strike
threat was followed by a later strike which was echoed by several interview respondents. These
respondents spoke to the credible strike threat as savings account analogy. The value of a credible strike threat accumulates and grows over time if it is reinforced by continuous educating, organizing, and action by the membership.
Possibly the most critical approach to developing a credible strike threat is how union leadership
and staff engage with the membership to organize a credible strike threat. The process used illustrates how the respondents saw the union and the rank and file members as separate entities or
one and the same. Among the tactics to organize the membership were holding sign making parties, member phone banks, signing commitment cards, and circulating petitions to identify key
issues and measure member support. Only two survey and six interview respondents reported using house visits, small group, social activities such as barbecues, or one on one personalized conversations with members to organize them and build commitment for the strike. Allen and Alex
noted how the union sets up committees to raise awareness and obtain commitment from spouses
and family in addition to members. FAQ noted that a key group of members are the older workers who are relied on to pass along their institutional memory to educate and organize the
younger members. Many survey and interview respondents reported starting these communication efforts with members as early as possible before a formal strike threat was issued and some
reported doing so before or when bargaining begins. Only one interview respondent reported doing so year around. While no respondent spoke to this, such efforts to educate, organize, and act
may be interpreted as a threat to strike whether or not it the threat is formally made.
These communications were conducted by an assortment of staff, elected officers, site representatives, and stewards. They recruited and trained members as picket captains, building alliances
with other existing unions, student groups, local and state elected representatives, and religious
leaders.
Most of the survey and interview respondents spoke to the use of site reps, stewards, and core
rank and file members doing one on one meetings with the membership and using petitions,
meetings, and surveys of the membership to identify the key grievances and issues that would
motivate the membership to prepare for a strike threat and potential strike. However, several respondents elaborated on how gauging the members’ concerns was not just to obtain the desired
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information but was also simultaneously a strategy for organizing the membership to gain practice, confidence, and skills to strike. They spoke to this dual use as a critical criteria for issuing a
credible strike threat.
The objective of communicating with the membership was not merely to identify their issues of
concern but which issues they feel strongly enough about to strike over. Issues of concern that
could be considered a strike issue in turn drives the tactics and strategy that prepare the membership to strike.
Although the survey respondents identified various issues that led to the strike threat including
wages and benefits (8), job security (3), and work control issues (2). The interview respondents
identified wages and benefits (8), job security (6), schedule (3), workplace safety and security
(2), and job classification and outsourcing (1 each). Wages and benefits are broadly defined as
rate of pay, hourly pay, salaries, health care, pensions, and pay cuts. Job security issues include
workload, short staffing, retirement, two tiered pay for new hires, and workload. Scheduling issues also included mandatory overtime.
There were several recurrent themes that ran through what we learned from the survey respondents. Several emphasized the critical importance of not only providing information about the issues which a significant number of members feel strongly enough to strike over. They also focused on how that information should be delivered in personalized meetings to inform, build
commitment, and recruit rank and file leaders to lead the threatened strike. Personalized face to
face organizing combined with a wide range of escalating action and alliance building are the
crucial elements of a credible strike threat. Some respondents referred to members supporting the
strike wearing a certain color of clothing or uniform, button, or sticker to inform fellow members
and the employer of the widespread support for the strike. One interview respondent insisted that
such shows of commitment should organically originate from the members although few were
able to give examples.
Several interview respondents spoke to the need to draw members into the organizing by making
personal contact, listening to their issues and concerns, identifying issues members will strike
over, and finding ways prepare them to take the lead in the strike campaign. These tactics are
implicit in the “bullseye model” of organizing being popularized by Labor Notes magazine and
its’ Secrets of a Successful Organizer book and trainings. Cawley reported little experience with
successful strike threats specifically described using the bullseye model. After mapping the
membership to identify the engaged members (the center ring) and lesser and unengaged members in the consecutive outer rings with the objective of the engaged members organizing the
other members to move everyone into the center ring.
The assumption of the bullseye model is that a strike threat vote and strike cannot be lead by
elected leadership and staff because it will not appear widely supported and thus not credible to
employer. This is the reason many of the survey and interview respondents spoke to the need for
a near consensus of members publicly supporting the strike. When rank and file members, especially those who have rarely or never been active in the union, step up to take the lead or become
active organizers, the threat to strike will be credible. If the workers also have potentially disruptive leverage, widespread public support, and positive earned (not purchased) media coverage the
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employer’s costs will rise as it risks losing customers, clients, and damage to its brand or public
image. These are crucial criteria for a credible strike threat. If the employer is cost sensitive the
credible threat will be effective in bringing the employer back to the table to concede on key issues to avoid the rising costs.
Mapping the Readiness to Strike
Once this information is collected, respondents spoke to how the union and key rank and file
leaders analyzed the composition of the workforce to identify the readiness of the workers to
strike. Muna discussed mapping the facility to identify every work unit and every worker in the
units to ensure that all of them have been contacted by the point persons, engage the inactive
workers, and convert those on the fence or opposed to striking.
While this is a thorough strategy to build widespread commitment and engagement critical to
making a strike threat credible it also underlies two problems with the organizing strategy. Just
holding mass membership meetings to discuss issues, bargaining, and striking or sending emails
or newsletters are insufficient to gauge the necessary level of membership support. Meetings and
written communication are all too frequently one way affairs in which leadership and staff produce and send information and the rank and file receive and consume it. This type of structure is
hierarchical, flowing downward from staff to stewards to point person to mass membership. If
information about valid strike issues flow up and then strategy flows down there will be a power
differential between the rank and file and leadership and staff particularly if the latter identify
strike issues that do not move or resonate with the membership. At this point when critically sensitive information about strike preparations are less likely to circulate the membership may become disengaged or disenchanted with being sidelined from the strike planning and disempowered from designing and putting their own tactics and strategy into action.
The second problem is that it also relies on convincing and converting those who are not already
committed or opposed to the union or the possible strike. Those members will be the least willing to take the risks of escalating action, be unreliable when action is taken, and bring less
knowledge and passion to the campaign. For this reason, member to member rather than staff to
member organizing was reported to be preferable and more effective by respondents.
For example, Pasha’s union used publicly viewable sign up sheets and “why I’m voting yes” videos to build commitment and demonstrate how credible the threat was even though state law prohibits public workers from striking and even penalizes unions when they occur. Uncommitted
members are more likely to become committed when they can observe other committed members taking public action and the organizing for the strike is taking place horizontally between
the members rather than vertically from the staff. Because this union settled without striking this
union involved the largest number of workers of all the strike threats we recorded between 20112016.
Communicating the Message to the Public
Most survey and interview respondents identified a range of approaches to communicating their
message to the public. Four survey and six interview respondents discussed efforts to generate
media coverage for their campaign. One interview respondent explained that their message was
designed by a public relations (PR) consultant and several other interview respondents reported
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that staff handled media relations and messaging internally. Among the efforts to communicate
with the public were posting to bulletin boards and “community outreach,” “official communications,” ads on buses, radio and in newspapers, stickers, marching on the employer’s home, having local and state governments pass resolutions, protesting at shareholder meetings, public letters of support from local prominent persons, using a website and a Facebook page, hiring a PR
consultant, meeting editorial boards, writing letters to the editor and op eds, calling in to radio
shows, and using a strike trailer.
Many of these respondents emphasized the importance of publicity to get the message of their
commitment to striking across to the employer. One respondent discussed how they encourage
workers to “talk tough” on the shopfloor with one another and the employer as a tactic to publicize the strike preparations and demonstrating the commitment to striking among the members.
However, no respondent explained how media publicity was used strategically to build mass
public support or damage public perception of the employer. Among the respondents media publicity seems to be something that needs to be done without an analysis of how it should be done,
by whom, and how it compliments the strategy.
Some workers benefit from the already existing positive public perception of their work which
makes their effort to build public support easier. Muna attributed the repeated success in issuing
effective strike threats that achieve most of what they demand to the positive public perception
of her type of hospital care workers. Nurses have widespread public support, Muna pointed out,
because the public values them and can relate to them as people and workers. “As nurses we
have a huge advantage….Everybody love a nurse…nurses became heroes.”
In the calculus of what makes a credible strike threat, mass public support is a crucial asset that
strengthens the weight of the workers’ leverage. Few categories of workers can be said to have
such widespread positive normative recognition. Public support for teachers has waned as a result of relentless attacks from the charter industry and politicians tied to claims of “failed
schools” and personal attacks on the character, motivations, and skills of teachers. Nevertheless,
Catherine reported that parents and students tend to side with teachers in contract disputes although it wasn’t explained when they do not.
This kind of positive public perception is a key strategic component of a credible strike threat.
Mass public support due to positive social norms significantly eases the costly and difficulty task
of buying or earning mass media coverage. It also dramatically raises the costs of a strike to the
employer since the public is more likely to stay away from their facilities due to support for
nurses, for example, and safety concerns from the use of strike breakers. This is also true for
transit workers such as pilots or train workers because customers are hesitant to fly on a plane or
take a train driven by less experienced replacement workers. Interestingly, Muna in hospital care
work pointed out that the union lacks a permanent strike fund and almost always does one day
strikes. Whether those short strikes intended to let workers blow off a little steam or because it
demonstrates the level of commitment of the workers to striking is not yet clear. It is also unclear
why even predicable symbolic one day strikes are needed if their strike threat is credible.
Setting Up a Strike Fund
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Setting up a strike fund is another key tactic in preparing for a strike. However, there was no
consensus among the interview and survey respondents as to whether to have one. Several interview respondents reported that their unions lack a permanent strike fund or only start one at the
time the threat is issued. One union requires the locals fund themselves, request “grants” from
the national union, and seek donations from other unions to provide strike benefits. An interview
respondent noted that most strikes in their sector last less than 5 days because their local chapters
are responsible for their own funding during a strike.
There is no consistency among the respondents on this issue. One interview respondent observed
that their significant strike fund makes their strike threat more credible. Cawley contrasted that
with an allied union that struck with them recently. Because it lacked a strike fund the allied union had difficulty presenting a credible strike threat since their members would not last on a long
strike.
Allen and Alex noted that although their union has a “major contingency fund” it doesn’t pay
strike benefits in order to demonstrate the members’ commitment to striking because of the loss
of their salaries by doing so. This raises the question of whether the workers or employer will
pay the heavier cost from a strike. The assumption is that because their members are highly paid
they are willing to use their personal assets to supplement their lost income during a strike,
something that is not available to most workers. At the same time, most of their employers are
also very large multinational corporations that could easily outlast them which they observed had
led to a strike defeat in the 1980s.
Not paying strike benefits is a problematic strategy. The credibility of a strike threat is not convincing the employer of the workers’ willingness to pay high costs from a strike that might not
be recovered by a later contract settlement. A credible strike threat convinces the employer that it
will pay the highest costs when the workers strike and would reduce its costs by conceding to the
workers demands before they strike.
Although no respondent reported having a permanent strike fund, not having one may allow the
leadership to tamp down on the members’ ambition to strike. A leadership that wants to settle by
avoiding a strike raises the costs for the members to strike by not having a substantially large
strike fund. The members, particularly if they are low waged and lack savings, will perceive the
costs of striking as too high and accede to the prerogatives of the leadership to avoid a strike. Because the members and employer, know that a strike would be too costly the union will have not
have a credible strike threat. If the leadership’s strategy fails and the workers carry through on
their insistence to strike, by voting down an offer to settle for example, it will either be a limited
symbolic action or result in defeat when the workers are starved back to work. The lack of a
large strike fund is an almost certain indicator of the lack of a credible strike threat.
Escalation
It is possible to make some observations about the role of incremental escalation of tactics to
make the strike threat credible to not only the employer and the public but also the workers
themselves. There is not a preset list of tactics to be deployed and checked off from the list to
make a strike threat credible. Workers devise and draw on a what Charles Tilly calls a repertoire
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of tactics.15 The tactics in the repertoire are the outcome of closely studying their issues, the political conditions, balance of power between workers and employer, member commitment and
participation, public support, and the employer’s possible responses to each tactic. Understanding the costs and benefits of each tactic give the workers information about which tactics could
be used effectively at certain times and under certain conditions. This is a reason why several respondents identified the need for research in preparing a strike threat vote.
Three of the survey respondents and two of the interview respondents described taking “incremental” workplace actions that escalate pressure on the employer to settle. One interview respondent said the union engaged in acts of mass civil disobedience in which disruptive action
was expected to lead to arrest. Although it is unclear what the specific tactical steps were the
later respondent’s suggests that there was an effort to escalate tactics by “turning up the heat” on
employers as the strike date approached.
The respondents were exploring relationship between what Tilly called the IOMO factors—interests, organization, mobilization, and opportunity. The workers assessed how the employer responds to certain tactics and if they lead to new opportunities to further their interests they gradually escalated the intensity of the proceeding tactics until the rising costs to the employer pushed
them to settle before the strike occurred.
Cawley similarly described how the members build the credibility of their strike threat by mapping an “escalating set of actions” in which they proceed through low intensity tactics through
higher intensity tactics in order to build their experience organizing themselves and shoring up
their courage to take risks and sense of empowerment to act. Cawley made clear how the most
credible strike threat is one in which the members are empowering themselves and drawing increasing commitment from members who are uncommitted or even opposed to striking not
merely by signing a petition or card committing themselves to strike but by taking actions of escalating tension to move themselves to act rather than the verbal expression of the need to strike.
“As we went through our escalating tactics, we were educating members” and demonstrating
their commitment to the employer by their deeds rather than just their words. As more workers
demonstrate a willingness to act while intensifying their tactics less or uncommitted workers
may take advantage of the opportunity to participate when they sense the potential costs decline
and possible gains rise from doing so. Such a strategy uses action not merely words to change the
minds of less or uncommitted workers.
This effectively described a strategy for communicating with, organizing, and acting by incrementally escalating tactics to make their strike threat credible to the employer. As the opportunity to incrementally escalate rises, the advantageous outcomes of doing so demonstrates that
the gains to the workers and costs to the employer will simultaneously rise. This will bring more
less or uncommitted workers into the center ring, expand public support, and raise the potential
costs of a strike to the employer. Such an escalation of tactics in a “strategy of tension” will
demonstrate the credibility of the strike threat and push the employer to settle at a lower cost
than might otherwise result from a strike.16
15
16

See Tilly, 1978.
See Ovetz 2018 forthcoming.
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The interview respondent whose union engaged in two acts of civil disobedience explained a
clear series of escalating actions that raised the tension on the employer with the ultimate expectation that they would proceed to the threatened illegal strike. While the workers were willing to
pay both fines and the costs of imprisonment the costs to the employer were higher because they
settled on the eve of the strike. In effect, using civil disobedience places the employer in the tenuous position of taking an escalated action that raises its costs by provoking disruption, causing
physical harm to workers and allies, and losing public support. If the strike threat is credible civil
disobedience puts the question to the employer, “Are you willing to face the higher costs of a
strike over this issue?” thereby forcing the employer to choose.
The criteria that make a strike threat credible are self-amplifying. Using tactics that increase the
tension against the employer gives the workers confidence, experience, skills, and support that
further raises the costs to the employer and makes the threat more credible. This allows the
workers to continue making a “deposit” in the “savings bank” upon which they can later draw.
The two survey respondents and two interview respondents who referred to taking incrementally
escalating actions were making this point. Going beyond mass and one on one membership
meetings into the streets and the workplace with marches, sick ins, sick outs, ca cannying (eg,
work to rule, working inefficiently, badmouthing the employer), wildcat strikes, and other tactics
provide leverage to pressure the employer to settle at the risk of greater costs by not doing so and
facing a strike.
When a Strike Threat is Not Credible
Using a strategy of tension is an innovative alternative to a predictable formulaic strategy that
result in uncredible strike threats. Catherine concluded that a strike threat is not credible when
the employer isn’t threatened by the “usual pressure points.” This respondent observed how
threatening to strike at the right time may make the threat more credible. For example, Catherine
explained, threatening to strike when Average Daily Attendance funding is no longer counted at
the end of the school year will not result in a financial cost for the school. And if they do strike it
will be ineffective because the school year will soon end and the momentum will be lost. As a
result, the threat will not provide the necessary leverage to extract the desired concessions without having to strike. For this respondent, the most credible and effective strike threat is when the
employer knows they will pay a higher cost from a strike. For a strike threat to be credible both
workers and the employer have to recognize that the costs will be highest for the employer if the
strike occurs. When the right time is requires an analysis of when the costs of striking to the employer will rise if it does not settle.
Ian explained how members designed a tactic in which they engaged in mini wildcat strikes by
marching on their lunch hour and returning late. This union’s recent strike threat resulted in a region-wide strike that continued as each workplace settled their own unique grievances against
different employers. This strategy dramatically raised the costs nationwide as the supply of the
crucial product was severely limited by both the strike and an accident at a key plant that shut
down production. Nevertheless, the strike threat lacked credibility because a strike followed and
was gradually dissipated by settling separately with workers in each workplace. As each local
strike was settled the costs to the holdout employers continued to fall. It also turns out that two
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consecutive “failed” strike threats resulted in strikes that lasted one to two months with unknown
outcomes.
Three interview respondents addressed the role of innovating tactics specific to their industry as
leverage to raise the costs to the employer. Attacking some of the employer’s predictable tactics
of union-busting and strikebreaking can also reduce the cost of a strike threat to the workers.
Terry’s union monitors and reports on the employer’s tactics and makes it available to the public.
The union pursues a formulaic attempt to identify and file a credible unfair labor practices (ULP)
charge against the employer. But it does so by using the employer’s tactics against them by having members sign up with the strikebreaking contractor and then organize the strikebreakers to
walk out in solidarity and prompt the employer to discriminate against pro-union contract workers in order to generate a ULP. While these are creative tactics to generate legal leverage against
the employer they are not organizing the members in such a way as to strengthen the credibility
of the strike threat. Because the strikes are still occurring the cost to the employer is still too low
to make the threat credible.
Allen, Alex, and Terry observed how threatening to strike has greater leverage if the workers are
capable of disrupting the industry, sector, or even a major transport hub such as an airport or
port. Even a small number of workers going on strike can cause significant disruption raising the
employer’s costs if the threat is carried through. There are some types of workers that if withdrawn are sufficient to cause widespread disruption. Workers that are central to operations and
not easily replaceable can make credible threats just by their strategic location in the industry.
Such strategically placed workers can also provide support to workers who lack similar leverage
because all the workers remaining at work cannot function and operations come to a halt.
However, the strategic position of any group of workers or union is not reliable in itself. With the
introduction of predictive analytics, robotization, automation, and deskilling, a union that perceives its members to be critically irreplaceable has fallen victim to hubris and may soon find
they have seriously miscalculated just how strategically central they really are. Rationalization
threatens to weaken the strategic importance of all types of work from fast food workers to lawyers and truck drivers to university professors. Drones are replacing highly skilled pilots with
technicians sitting behind a computer, lawyers by outsourcing and automated document review,
and teachers and professors are being displaced by artificial intelligence and on-line education.
The credibility of a strike threat cannot be anchored on merely the strategic location of the workers or the irreplaceability of their skills because, as the history of class conflict demonstrates,
technological innovation and rationalization is driven by the compulsion to discipline and remove well organized, unmanageable, and disobedient workers.17
Credible Threats and Failed Strikes
It is also possible that a strike threat may be credible but still result in a strike, including one
which the workers lose. A credible strike threat may still result in a strike for two reasons. Either
the employer may not have accurately assessed the readiness of the workers to strike or the
workers may not have adequately communicated it to the employer. As a result, a credible strike
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threat may result in a strike which provides an advantageous outcome for the workers. Alternatively, the strike may fail because the costs of the employer conceding to the workers demands is
higher than the costs of the strike. In both cases the strike threat was credible because it resulted
in a strike although the outcomes were entirely different.
The savings bank analogy of credible strike threats tells us that the recent past matters. A recently successful strike threat or strike that followed a credible strike threat would both provide a
disincentive for a cost sensitive employer risking another strike if the workers did not de-mobilize or de-escalate in the intervening time period. Such an employer could be expected to be
more likely to concede to a second credible threat.
However, if consecutive strike threats result in strikes, whether they resulted in advantageous or
disadvantageous outcomes for the workers, we could question whether the threats have been
credible. A strike threat that results in a strike does not necessarily mean the threat was not credible. Rather, the employer may have wrongly assessed the factors that made the threat credible or
mis-calculated their costs of a potential strike. But we can also assume that the employer accurately assessed the threats not to be credible and were willing to risk the strike and absorb the
lower costs.
We can more closely examine three interviews with respondents who work as staff with unions
that have struck several times in the past decade or so. Ian explained how two previous strikes
only a few years apart and lasting between one to two months followed “failed” strike threats.
The other interview respondent cited the union’s frequent strikes as reflecting the credibility of
their strike threats—their willingness to strike in the past demonstrates their willingness to strike
in the future. But which one is it? These two respondents seem to take polar opposite positions.
One possible conclusion is that the need for both unions to strike repeatedly demonstrates that
their threats are not credible. Although we do not know the outcome of both of these respondents’ strikes the need to repeatedly strike or strike again only a few years after the last strike
raises issues about why the employer continues to risk the costs of a strike.18 It is also possible
that the employer is provoking the strike based on an accurate assessment of the lack of credible
past and present strike threats. For example, if a strike fund is missing or too small, the employer
may expect to outlast the strikers and extract even more concessions from the workers than if
they had settled before the strike. In other words, the employer accurately perceived that the cost
of conceding to the workers’ demands was higher than the costs inflicted by the strike. The strike
18

It is possible to assess if a credible strike threat is successful if the threat caused the employer to move
in a positive direction on a critical issue in bargaining. But what may be considered positive depends on
context, conditions, opportunities, and costs of further escalation. While we asked on-line respondents
“What was the outcome of the strike threat?” and provided several options and a comment box we did not
ask for whether their achieved their original objectives. As a result, we avoid assessing whether the outcome of bargaining, a strike threat, or strike is “successful” for the workers in achieving their objectives
for several reasons. First, the workers may vote overwhelmingly to ratify a settlement to receive less than
what they intended to achieve if they continued to escalate and on strike. Secondly, the public may widely
perceive the workers to have lost while the vast majority of the workers perceive to have made gains from
their strike threat. Either way, the outcome may appear to be a gain while substantially less than their intended goals.
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threats cannot be considered credible if they resulted in repeated strikes whose outcomes were
not advantageous to the workers.
Cawley, who described their bullseye and “escalating set of actions” strategies, spoke to how the
failure of their recent strike to achieve their objectives led them back to the negotiating table. But
this respondent hesitated to call it a “failure” because it was their first strike against that particular employer and as such is a necessary step in building the basis for later credible strike threats.
Cawley assesses the credibility of a strike threat based on whether or not they had previously
struck the employer. This was contrasted with a strike against a different employer a year earlier
which is perceived to be successful. “At [that employer] we don’t strike every time, but we strike
enough that our threats are credible.” In other words, striking periodically is associated with
practicing the tactics so as to demonstrate their willingness and capacity to strike to the employer.
This analysis raises the question of whether “practice” with a single prior strike or previous infrequent strikes demonstrate the credibility of a strike threat. Assuming workers need practice
striking demonstrates a lack of clarity about what it means for a strike threat to be credible. For
example, if workers, such as those this respondent organizes, are in a service industry with high
turnover, many of the workers will not have experienced the previous build up to the threat or
strike. If economic, social, and political conditions are substantially different from the past strike,
regardless of its outcome, there will be little bearing on present circumstances. For example, the
entry into that industry by new on-line or low cost competitors since the last strike will change
the cost calculus for an employer in several ways.
Just having struck in the recent past does not make a strike threat credible if all the criteria discussed above have not been satisfied. It is true striking does help to make the union and teach
workers about their power by exercising it. But if the costs to the employer from the strike are
not significantly high enough to force them to concede the strike may have the opposite effect of
making strikes appear to be futile and expensive to the workers. Striking just to practice the tactic is insufficient to make a later strike threat credible.
Ultimately, it is unclear whether previous strikes contribute much to a current strike threat if the
key elements that make a strike threat credible are inadequate or missing each consecutive time.
According to the savings bank analogy, regardless of its outcome a previous strike that is not followed up by educating, organizing and activating membership loses value and puts the credibility of strike threats in doubt. Cawley, who reported the union’s bullseye and escalation strategies,
was among the most sophisticated of all the survey and interview respondents. However, because
they still needed to strike to assert their demands it would be worthwhile to examine whether
they effectively met the criteria for a credible strike threat. By contrast, Terry, whose union
strikes frequently, didn’t speak at all to how they prepare a credible strike threat, instead insisting
that their record of frequent strikes demonstrated the credibility of the threats.
These three interview respondents interpret workers’ willingness to carry out crippling strikes to
demonstrate the credibility of a strike threat. Terry from the transport sector reported that his union participates in one or two strikes per year. One strike three years earlier lasted for six months.
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However, Terry was confident that their substantially large strike fund, leadership with strike experience, and record of going on long, well organized strikes reflect the credibility of the strike
threat. Describing it as a mistake to perceive striking as a common sign of a failed threat, Terry
was instead confident that striking is necessary to give weight to the strike threats. In other
words, strikes strengthen the credibility of later strike threats.
These two respondents were perhaps the most enlightening of all the survey and interview respondents. They reflect the assessment of unions with a history of engaging in long and frequent
strikes that the strike re-enforces the credibility of the threat not the other way around. Since
these workers are in a critical transportation hub a small number of striking workers have been
able to amplify the impact of their disruption by paralyzing the entire regional sector. While we
do not know whether the strikes resulted in gains for the workers it does raise the question as to
why the employers would be willing to risk further costs when when previous strikes have already proven costly.
While it may be possible for a few transport workers to inflict high costs relatively quickly on an
employer a closer examination is needed to explain why their consecutive strike threats still lead
to strikes. How valid is their argument that the strike strengthens the credibility of later strike
threats? We do not have enough information to assess the details of the threat but it may be that
the strike threat was not credible because the employer’s costs from a strike were lower than the
union thought meaning that the threat was not credible. But did the consecutive strike occur because the next threat also lacked credibility? Or did the outcome of the first strike produce too
little cost to the employer to discourage ignoring the second threat? It is also possible that the
employer repeatedly misevaluated the costs or was willing to take the risk of ignoring the threat
and facing another strike. However, it could be expected that an employer who misevaluates a
first threat is sure to more carefully assess a second in following the dictum of “once burned
twice shy.” While it is hard for us to answer these questions due to the lack of details of each
threat it is something workers making a strike threat can be expected to do.
The tactics, strategy and composition of capital may also be considered in assessing these three
respondents’ answers. Despite their record of repeated strikes the limited scope of the strikes
may actually be less costly than the industry-wide concessions demanded by the workers. This
may be especially the case if the strikes are localized and can be resolved under different separate terms, as two of them were.19 (Cawley and Ian) However, these strikes may be more costly
than replacing the workers with automated technology that is expected to hit the third respondent’s sector of the transport industry in the near future. (Terry)
Just being willing to go on long and frequent strikes itself is not in itself a formula for a winning
strategy. A union that does so should ask if they can achieve the same or more with a credible
strike threat thereby avoiding the inevitable higher risks to the workers of having to strike. A
strike that fails to gain more than it might have otherwise achieved from settling after making a
19

This respondent also identified how employers will use public disclosure of union financial reports to bring legal charges against the union for unfair labor practices and claims of sabotage to
drain their funds.
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credible strike threat could be considered a failure. In such cases it should be asked whether there
are other factors contributing to their going on strike.20 Certainly a union that has a history of recent strikes should have the necessary information to adequately assess this calculus.
The Objective of a Credible Strike Threat
When it comes to the question of objectives many of the respondents’ focus lay elsewhere. Most
referred to a credible strike threat as one that will keep bargaining going, to prepare members for
a possible strike, and to make a statement to the employer. Not a single respondent identified the
threat as a means to achieving the workers’ objectives. For example, one interview respondent
explained that the strike threat serves to ensure that the employer knows the workers’ demands
are important to strike over. But is the objective of making a strike threat merely to convince the
employer of workers determination to strike so as to avoid a strike? The objective of making a
credible strike threat is not merely a choice between avoiding a strike or striking. Nor is the objective of a credible strike threat to ensure the employer knows the determination of the workers
to strike. The objective of the credible strike threat is for the workers’ to achieve their desired
objectives—be it higher wages, better benefits, more control over work, improved conditions,
lower hours, etc.—while minimizing the costs to themselves of direct confrontation with the employer in the form of stopping work. Using a credible strike threat to convince the employer of
the workers’ determination to strike is the means to that objective, it’s not the objective itself.
Analysis
Lack of a Consensus on What Makes a Strike Threat Credible
Although some respondents spoke to what makes a strike threat there was not a consensus as to
how to evaluate whether or not it is credible. Few of the respondents appear to identify a credible
strike threat as one that moves the employer to concede to the workers demands that results in
gains for the workers without striking.
While we also found no common criteria for how to prepare a strike threat we have identified a
near consensus among the respondents as to the role that education, organization, and action by
the rank and file makes for establishing a credible strike threat. That there were many tactics to
educate and organize the membership in preparation to strike and the types of actions they would
take identified it is due to the varying circumstances of issues, workplace, powers relations, levels of commitment, public support and other factors. That most respondents spoke to the need to
combine these three factors in preparing a strike threat indicates that workers, leadership, and
staff may be becoming more experienced with making strike preparations.

A Resurgent Labor Movement?
A strike threat is not only credible when the workers are prepared to strike but when the employer is convinced they will and the outcome will be costlier than conceding to their demands.
Workers can engage in a wide selection of organizing activities to move the employer to settle
20

This is not merely a question of game theory. Workers and employers have access to virtually all the
information they need unlike in the prisoners’ dilemma. It could be argued that class conflict is not
merely about lowering costs and raising gains but to change the system which is equivalent to ending the
game. A union that repeatedly engaged in successful strikes has the capacity to escalate the outcome a
strike beyond merely material gains in wages, benefits, and working conditions.
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before a strike occurs. Our study clearly shows that the number of strike threats is on the rise.
But what does it mean for understanding the state of the labor movement?
Threats that result in successful gains will provide lessons about how unions are effectively educating and organizing their workers to strike. Measuring and understanding strike threats is critically important for providing a wider view of the state of the union movement and worker organization. If about 199 percent more workers are involved in strike activity short of striking (or being locked out) then this tells us that there is substantially more willingness of workers to take
action to achieve their demands than thought.
The significant number of strike threats may be an indicator that efforts to transform the unions
from the inside have become effective in pushing unions to escalate their tactics and strategy.
What we do not yet definitively know is whether the impetus to prepare a specific strike threat is
coming from the rank and file or leadership. However, our survey and interview findings suggest
that in these specific strike threats the impetus is very much top down. Our respondents commonly used language that indicates a continued dichotomy between the prerogatives of the “union” and the rank and file “membership”. This is likely due to the overrepresentation of union
leadership and staff among our respondents who reflect on the strike threat through the lens of
their position in the union. Further study of rank and file members may result in different findings.
Because we lack adequate details for each strike threat identified in this study, it would be premature to consider the rising number of strike threats an indicator of a resurgent labor movement.
However, the rising number of strike threats may be a indicator that unions are becoming not
only more confrontational but moving back towards the organizing rather than service model of
unions as they seek to increasingly leverage confrontation to extract gains in bargaining.21
What we did not find is much evidence that workers are returning to social movement unionism
or what is called “solidarity unionism”. Cawley spoke to how their use of the bullseye model and
“escalating set of actions” strategies are predicated on the solidarity principle of worker organizing rather than either the organizing or service models. For Cawley, their strategy is to approach
preparation for a strike threat as broader than a single workplace. “I think also as a union, not
acting in your narrow interest…thinking of ourselves as a broader movement [for] social justice.” However, we lack sufficient details for all of the strike threats we examined to evaluate
how workers acted as part of an organized social movement in a way that differs substantially
from the routinized efforts to identify and receive support from allies.
Although there is still more to learn from studying strike threats one thing is clear. Many unions
are beginning to make the long overdue shift from the service to the organizing model and use
confrontation alongside collective bargaining as a contingency for when negotiation fails.
21

The organizing model of unions is best reflected above in the bullseye model in which unions activate
their members to act on their own behalf rather than advocate for them. The service model is one in which
the union services the contract by representing members in grievances, represent them in workplace issues, and negotiates on their behalf over issues of wages and benefits. These contrast with the social
movement model is one in which unions organize around issues of social transformation that connect to
the workplace than just wages and benefits of their members.
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Whether the membership settles through bargaining or extracting concessions by raising the
costs to the employer by striking and other disruptive tactics, credible strike threats are likely to
continue to be common in the years to come and should be counted.
Recommendations
Measuring the number of strike threats would be of interest to employers, unions, and the public.
For this reason we make the following recommendations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The BLS should include strike threats in its strike reports
The BLS should count strike threats and strikes in all workplaces regardless of the number of
employees
The BLS should survey employers and unions to record the number of strike threats
Employers and unions should be required to report strike threats, lockouts, and other strike
related activities
Employers and unions should be required to report exact numbers of workers and other data
related to strike threats, lockouts, and other strike related activities
The FMCS should report details of the outcome of settlements resulting from its intervention
in strike threats and strikes
The Office of Employment and Unemployment Statistics should require all states to include a
question on unemployment insurance filing forms about whether the unemployed worker is
unemployed due to a strike threat
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